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Abstract
We propose novel tools for the analysis of individual welfare on the basis of
aggregate household demand behavior. The method assumes a collective model of
household consumption with the public and private nature of goods specified by
the empirical analyst. A main distinguishing feature of our method is that it builds
on a revealed preference characterization of the collective model that is intrinsically
nonparametric. We show how to identify individual money metric welfare indices
from observed household demand, along with the intrahousehold sharing rule and
the individuals’ willingness-to-pay for public consumption (i.e. Lindahl prices). The
method is easy to use in practice and yields informative empirical results, which we
demonstrate through a simulation analysis and an empirical application to labor
supply data.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of individual welfare is at the core of the applied welfare literature. It is
relevant for a large variety of policy-relevant empirical questions. For example, when
assessing inequality in a society, one of the basic objects of interest is the consumption
level of individuals. If the within-household distribution of resources is highly unbalanced,
inequality between individuals will be very different from inequality between aggregate
households. In a similar spirit, it is individuals who have utilities and not households.
This pleads for using measures of individual welfare when empirically evaluating the
impact of policy reforms, such as tax reforms.
The empirical analysis of individual welfare raises two important challenges. Firstly,
at the empirical level, the analyst usually only observes the aggregate household expen-
ditures. The within-household sharing of resources is typically not observed.1 Secondly,
at the conceptual level, an important issue relates to the fact that households are intrin-
sically characterized by public consumption, which simultaneously benefits the different
household members. The question remains how to evaluate this public consumption in the
context of individual welfare analysis. This paper presents a novel empirical method for
the analysis of individual welfare that addresses both challenges. It is based on observed
aggregate household consumption behavior, and it effectively accounts for intrahoushold
public consumption in the evaluation of individual welfare.
We take as a starting point that the collective model of Apps and Rees (1988) and
Chiappori (1988, 1992) provides a well-suited conceptual framework for dealing with
these questions.2 The attractive feature of this model is that it explicitly recognizes
that households are not unitary decision making units, but consist of multiple decision
makers with own rational preferences. Observed household consumption is regarded
as the outcome of a within-household interaction process. The model (only) assumes
that this process leads to Pareto-efficient intrahousehold allocations. Such a non-unitary
approach to modeling households’ consumption behavior is particularly relevant for the
analysis of individual welfare, as it naturally allows us to account for the possibility of
an unequal distribution of resources and welfare within households. See, for example,
Chiappori and Meghir (2014) and Chiappori (2016) for extensive argumentation.
A main distinguishing feature of our method is that it builds on a revealed preference
characterization of the collective model that is intrinsically nonparametric (in the tradi-
tion of Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982)). The method does not require an
1In the past few years, more attention is given to the gathering of information on the consumption
of individuals inside households (see, for example, Browning and Goertz (2012) and Cherchye, De Rock,
and Vermeulen (2012)). Datasets with such information are still not widespread, though.
2The collective model has become a workhorse model in the family economics literature. It has
been proven to be a viable alternative to the unitary model that is deficient when used in a context of
multiperson decision making. See, for example, Browning and Chiappori (1998), Cherchye and Vermeulen
(2008), Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007, 2009, 2011), and Attanazio and Lechene (2014).
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explicit parametric/functional specification of the intrahousehold decision process (e.g.
individual preferences). This is particularly attractive from a conceptual point of view.
From an empirical perspective, one potential disadvantage of this robust methodology
is that the welfare-economic concepts will not be “point” identified but “set” identified
(yielding lower and upper bounds on the individual welfare measures, as we explain in
Sections 3 and 4). However, if the identified sets are tight (i.e. sharp upper and lower
bounds), the practical relevance of this issue is low. Moreover, if the nonparametrically
identified sets turn out to be wide, then this basically demonstrates that any more spe-
cific welfare-economic conclusion obtained from a parametric analysis is likely to depend
heavily on the (nonverifiable) functional structure that is imposed.
We focus on a collective model with public and private consumption, in which the
private and public nature of commodities is specified by the empirical analyst. We start
from the revealed preference characterization of this model (Cherchye, De Rock, and
Vermeulen, 2011), and we develop a method that can provide the empirical tools for
analyzing the individual welfare questions described above. First, we show how to iden-
tify the intrahousehold sharing rule, which defines the within-household distribution of
resources.3 Next, we build on this sharing rule identification to subsequently identify the
individuals’ money metric welfare indices, which define the income that individuals need
to be equally well off (in utility terms) when single as in their current households. Chi-
appori and Meghir (2014) particularly advocated the use of these indices for individual
welfare analysis based on the collective model in the presence of public goods. In our
empirical application, we will show that our identification method can be combined with
nonparametric (e.g. Nadaraya–Watson) as well as parametric (e.g. QUAIDS) demand
estimation, and that the method is straightforward to use in practice. In addition, it will
demonstrate that our method has substantial empirical bite, despite its nonparametric
orientation.
At the methodological level, this paper complements recent work of Cherchye, De Rock,
Lewbel, and Vermeulen (2015). Two main differences are that (1) this earlier paper fo-
cused on a general collective consumption model in which the (public or private) nature
of the goods is left unspecified, and (2) the proposed method allows for sharing rule re-
covery but not for identification of money metric welfare indices.4 This last difference
3The sharing rule takes a central position in empirical applications of collective consumption models.
See, for example, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene (1994), Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix
(2002), Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005), Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), Bourguignon, Browning,
and Chiappori (2009), Couprie, Peluso, and Trannoy (2010), Lise and Seitz (2011), Bargain and Donni
(2012), Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2012), Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2013) and Dunbar,
Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013) for various applications of the collective consumption model that make
use of the sharing rule concept.
4Technically, as we will explain below, the identification of money metric welfare indices requires
the recovery of individuals’ shadow/Lindahl prices of publicly consumed quantities. This recovery is
not possible by using Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and Vermeulen (2015)’s method for sharing rule
identification when the (public or private) nature of goods is unknown. As a direct implication, the
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directly motivates the relevance of our contribution in the current paper because, as indi-
cated above, money metric welfare indices have been advocated as particularly useful for
individual welfare analysis in a collective consumption context. Moreover, in empirical
applications it is often possible to formulate reasonable assumptions regarding the nature
of goods prior to the actual empirical analysis. For instance, this applies to the labor
supply setting that we will use as our leading example throughout this paper.
We will demonstrate the practical usefulness of our method by means of a simula-
tion exercise, as well as an empirical application to data drawn from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). Our simulation exercise will illustrate the collective consump-
tion mechanics underlying our identification method. Next, our empirical application is
the first one that uses nonparametric revealed preference techniques to implement the
collective money metric welfare concepts advocated by Chiappori and Meghir (2014) for
observational household consumption data. Through various exercises, we will show that
our method allows for an informative empirical analysis. For example, our results for
the money metric welfare index enable us to quantify the households’ economic gains
through public consumption (i.e. scale economies), and to assess the effects of household
income and relative wages on the intrahousehold (money metric) welfare distribution.
In addition, we will show how to use our method to assess the prevalence of individual
poverty, quantified in terms of both the sharing rule and money metric welfare indices.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we define our concept
of rational household behavior in terms of the collective consumption model. Section
3 presents our method for sharing rule identification, and Section 4 shows how to sub-
sequently identify individuals’ money metric welfare indices. As we will explain, our
revealed preference method leads to set identification (to be contrasted with the more
standard notion of point identification), meaning that we recover upper and lower bounds
on individual resource shares and money metric welfare indices. Section 5 presents our
simulation analysis, and Section 6 our application to PSID data. Section 7 concludes.
2 Collective rationality
We assume a standard setting in which households consist of two decision makers, member
1 and member 2. The empirical analyst observes a set N of household decision situa-
tions, which are characterized by aggregate consumption quantities, associated prices
and incomes. In our following simulation and empirical application, the set N will be
drawn from the observed household demand function, which sets out the households’
consumption quantities as a function of household level prices and incomes. Household
consumption will be partly public and partly private. The public and private nature of
identification strategy that we develop in the current paper, which will allow us to recover individual-
specific shadow prices, is substantively different from the one proposed by these authors.
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each good is specified prior to the empirical analysis.
To simplify the exposition, our following analysis will assume decision situations with
the number of commodities limited to three: good 1 is private and assignable to house-
hold member 1, good 2 is private and assignable to household member 2, and good 3 is
publicly consumed. As a specific example, we use the non-unitary labor supply setting
with goods 1 and 2 the male’s and female’s leisure, and good 3 the remaining household
consumption (measured as a Hicksian aggregate). The fact that we model the Hick-
sian aggregate consumption as public consumption allows it to be interpreted as purely
public consumption or, alternatively, as private consumption associated with (positive)
externalities.
This three-goods setting was studied by Chiappori (1988, 1992) in his original papers,
and will also be considered in our following simulation and empirical application. At
this point, we note that it is in principle possible to extend our following reasoning to
settings with more commodities. In fact, it may well be that some private goods are not
assignable to individual household members. However, in general we need that at least
one good is assignable to each member.
Formally, let l1E and l
2
E denote the time spent on leisure by members 1 and 2 in
household decision situation E ∈ N. Further, QE is the amount of the public good
in situation E. Finally, let w1E and w
2
E represent the individuals’ wages (i.e. prices of
leisure) and yE the household’s total expenditures on leisure and consumption, i.e. yE =
w1El
1
E + w
2
El
2
E +QE. Taken together, this defines the household data set
S = {(w1E, w2E, 1); (l1E, l2E, QE)}E∈N .
We say that the data set S is collectively rational if each decision situation E ∈ N can
be represented as Pareto efficient, which means that the household maximizes a weighted
sum of individual utility functions subject to a budget constraint.5
Definition 1 Collective rationality. The household data set S is collectively rational
if there exist individual utility functions U1 and U2 and bargaining weights µ1E and µ
2
E
such that, for all decision situations E ∈ N,
(l1E, l
2
E, QE) = arg max
l1,l2,Q
µ1EU
1(l1, Q) + µ2EU
2(l2, Q)
s.t.
w1El
1 + w2El
2 +Q ≤ w1El1E + w2El2E +QE.
The Pareto weights µ1E and µ
2
E in the objective function represent the relative bar-
gaining power of the household members 1 and 2. We remark that these bargaining
5Throughout, we follow Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2011) by assuming that the individual
utility functions U1 and U2 are continuous, monotone and concave.
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weights may vary depending on the decision situation E. Obviously, identifying these
Pareto weights can give insight into the intrahousehold distribution of bargaining power.
However, the value of these weights will strongly depend on the cardinalization of the
utility functions U1 and U2.
An intrinsic feature of the collective model is the so-called sharing rule, which governs
the within-household distribution of resources. This sharing rule is often interpreted as an
alternative indicator of the relative bargaining power of individual household members.
Unlike the Pareto weights µ1E and µ
2
E, an attractive feature of the sharing rule is that
it is expressed in monetary terms. Moreover, as argued in the Introduction, the sharing
rule can be instrumental to addressing welfare questions that pertain to consumption
inequality between individuals.
In what follows, an important focus will be on sharing rule identification. Therefore,
it is useful to directly define collective rationality in terms of the sharing rule. To this
end, we formally specify individual i’s (i = 1, 2) expenditure/consumption share as
ηiE = w
i
El
i
E + θ
i
EQE,
which comprises the individual’s leisure component wiEl
i
E and a share θ
i
E of the public con-
sumption QE. The scalar θ
i
E gives individual i’s shadow price for the public consumption,
which intuitively corresponds to the individual’s willingness-to-pay for this consumption.
Then, the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics obtains the following
equivalent definition of collective rationality.
Definition 2 Collective rationality: sharing rule representation. The household
data set S is collectively rational if there exist individual utility functions U1 and U2,
expenditure shares η1E and η
2
E and shadow prices θ
1
E and θ
2
E such that, for all decision
situations E ∈ N,
(liE, QE) = arg maxU
i(li, Q)
s.t.
wiEl
i + θiEQ ≤ ηiE
with θ1E + θ
2
E = 1.
This definition provides a “decentralized” expression of collective rationality. It shows
that, for a given sharing rule (defining η1E and η
2
E), collective rationality imposes individ-
ually rational (i.e. utility maximizing) behavior of each household member separately.
Furthermore, the shadow prices θ1E and θ
2
E can be interpreted as Lindahl prices because
Pareto efficiency requires these prices to sum to the price of the household’s public con-
sumption (i.e. θ1E + θ
2
E = 1, for 1 equal to the price of the Hicksian public good).
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3 Sharing rule recovery
In this section, we start from Definition 2 of collective rationality to address identifica-
tion of the individual shares η1E and η
2
E associated with an observed decision situation E.
Basically, the method obtains recovery of these individual shares under the maintained
assumption that the observed household consumption behavior satisfies collective ratio-
nality. In particular, we will show that we can define upper and lower bounds on the
expenditure shares by starting from a nonparametric revealed preference characterization
of the collective consumption model. The fact that we define bounds effectively obtains
“set” identification (in contrast to “point” identification) of the household’s sharing rule.
More specifically, our method recovers bounds on the shadow prices θiE, which directly
implies bounds on ηiE (= w
i
El
i
E +θ
i
EQE). The method builds on the individual rationality
requirement in Definition 2. The revealed preference characterization of this rationality
condition will define inequality restrictions for observed demand behavior, which in turn
will lead to set identification of θiE. By exploiting the revealed preference implications of
collective rationality, we can shrink the region of member i’s shadow prices in household
E from the trivial “uninformative” interval [0, 1] to an “informative” interval ΘiE =
[θi,lbE , θ
i,ub
E ] with θ
i,lb
E ≥ 0 and θi,ubE ≤ 1.
As we will explain, our bounds will not necessarily represent the tightest bounds that
can be obtained by exploiting all empirical restrictions implied by collective rationality.
In the following, we let ΦiE represent these tightest bounds. We will define Θ
i
E such that
ΦiE ⊆ ΘiE, i.e. ΘiE provides an empirical outer bound approximation of the theoretically
tightest set ΦiE. We will return to sharpness of our empirical bounds (defining Θ
i
E) at the
end of this section. Importantly, even though our bounds are not necessarily the tightest
possible bounds in theory, they will have substantial empirical bite, as we will show in
our simulation analysis in Section 5 and our application in Section 6. In addition, they
will be very easy to compute in practice.
In what follows we will assume to have an arbitrarily large set N of household con-
sumption bundles with associated prices. For example, in our simulation exercise and
empirical application in Sections 5 and 6, these bundles will be drawn from a household
demand function g that maps realizations of w1, w2 and y on (l1, l2, Q) = g(w1, w2, y).
At this point, we remark that, in principle, we could also have expressed our following
argument directly in terms of the continuous demand function g rather than in terms of
the discrete set N (along the lines of Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and Vermeulen (2015)).
However, using the discrete set N substantially facilitates our exposition. Moreover, as
we will explain below, it implies a very simple enumeration method to obtain ΘiE. Finally,
it shows that our proposed method is also directly applicable to settings with discrete sets
of household observations (as originally considered by Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen
(2011)).
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Individual (ir)rationality for given shadow prices. The basic idea is to exploit
that violations of individual rationality imply violations of collective rationality. Thus, we
have that the shadow price θiE is not sustainable when it leads to a violation of individual
rationality for individual i in household E. In that case, we conclude that θiE /∈ ΦiE. In
what follows, we characterize these unsustainable θiE in revealed preference terms, and
we will use this characterization to define the upper bound θi,ubE . Correspondingly, we
can define the lower bound θi,lbE = 1 − θj,ubE (j 6= i), by using the adding up condition
θ1E + θ
2
E = 1 for Lindahl prices.
More precisely, let us assume some given shadow prices θ1E and θ
2
E. Then, Definition
2 simultaneously imposes individual rationality on both household members: there must
exist utility functions U1 and U2 such that (l1E, QE) maximizes U
1 and (l2E, QE) maximizes
U2. Failure to find U i for at least one of the household members results in a rejection of
collective rationality for the specified θiE, which means θ
i
E /∈ ΦiE. We can rephrase this in
revealed preference terms, by using that a necessary condition for individual rationality
is that the data are consistent with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP).
For our setting, WARP consistency of individual i requires that, for all n, n′ ∈ N such
that (lin, Qn) 6= (lin′ , Qn′), there must exist shadow prices θin and θin′ that meet
winl
i
n + θ
i
nQn ≥ winlin′ + θinQn′ ⇒ win′lin + θin′Qn > win′lin′ + θin′Qn′ . (1)
A sufficient condition for θiE to be inconsistent with condition (1) is that, for some
n ∈ N ,
wiE(l
i
n − liE) + θiE(Qn −QE) < 0 and (2)
∀θin ∈ [0, 1] : win(liE − lin) + θin(QE −Qn) < 0. (3)
If conditions (2) and (3) hold simultaneously, then we conclude that, for any specification
of θin, the WARP requirement (1) is violated for the given θ
i
E. As a direct implication,
we have that θiE /∈ ΦiE.6
Finally, by replacing the second term on the right hand side of inequality (3) by its
maximum and minimum potential values (i.e. zero and (QE − Qn)), we obtain the two
inequalities
win(l
i
E − lin) < 0 and (4)
win(l
n
E − lin) + (QE −Qn) < 0, (5)
which hold simultaneously if and only if (3) holds. This reformulation will be useful in
6We remark that we work with a strict inequality in condition (2). We do so because it facilitates
the empirical implementation of our method. However, it also implies that, strictly speaking, we are not
exhausting all empirical implications associated with the WARP condition in (1).
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practical applications, as it avoids having to implement the universal quantifier in (3)
(for the unknown θin).
Defining ΘiE = [θ
i,lb
E , θ
i,ub
E ]. Building on our above argument, we can define a linear
program to compute the upper bound θi,ubE and lower bound θ
i,lb
E . Specifically, let δ be an
arbitrarily small fixed number, then we need to solve
θi,ubE = min
θ
θ − δ
s.t.
wiE(l
i
n − liE) + θ(Qn −QE) < 0 (for all n ∈ N)
win(l
i
E − lin) < 0 (for all n ∈ N)
win(l
i
E − lin) + (QE −Qn) < 0 (for all n ∈ N)
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
The intuition behind this program (which underlies our proof of Proposition 3) goes as
follows. Suppose that all inequality constraints are satisfied for a given value of θ, say θ¯.
Our above explanation (of (2), (4) and (5)) implies that this shadow price specification
θ¯ is inconsistent with the WARP condition (1). For the given θ¯, the second term on
the left hand side of the first inequality constraint will be negative (because the second
constraint implies liE < l
i
n). But then it easily follows that all feasibility constraints are
also satisfied for any θ > θ¯, i.e. any θ > θ¯ implies inconsistency with the WARP condition
(1). From this reasoning, we can define a “most informative” (i.e. lowest) upper bound
θi,ubE on WARP-consistent shadow prices by seeking the lowest value of θ that satisfies
the constraints of the above program. Finally, if the program is infeasible (i.e. an empty
feasible region; e.g. because liE > l
i
n for all n ∈ N), then we conclude that we cannot find
an informative upper bound. In that case, we set θi,ubE equal to one.
We subtract δ in the objective of our minimization problem because the program
recovers θ that do not sustain collective rationality (i.e. θ /∈ ΦiE), whereas θi,ubE defines
an upper bound on the shadow prices that sustain collective rationality. In particular,
the constraints of the problem guarantee consistency with (2), (4) and (5), which implies
(θi,ubE + δ) /∈ ΦiE. By solving a similar program, we can compute θj,ubE for member j 6= i,
which allows us to define the lower bound θi,lbE = 1 − θj,ubE . In turn, this obtains ΘiE =
[θi,lbE , θ
i,ub
E ].
We can now state our first main result.7
Proposition 3 We have that ΦiE ⊆ ΘiE = [θi,lbE , θi,ubE ].
As a final remark, because the set N is discrete, θi,ubE (and, thus, also θ
i,lb
E ) can be
computed by simple enumeration: it suffices to check feasibility of the above program
7See Appendix A for the proofs of our main results.
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for each n ∈ N separately, to subsequently define the minimum over all the feasible
outcomes. This makes it very easy to define ΘiE in practical applications.
Sharpness. In general, we have ΦiE ⊆ ΘiE, which means that ΘiE need not necessarily
exploit all the theoretical implications of collective rationality. One reason is that the
computation of θlbE and θ
ub
E is based on WARP, which only captures necessary implications
of individually rational behavior. As shown by Houthakker (1950), utility maximization
generally implies that the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) holds. SARP
extends WARP by also exploiting transitivity of preferences.8 Our focus on WARP
instead of SARP follows Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and Vermeulen (2015). As argued by
these authors, when exploiting SARP, it would be much more difficult, if not completely
intractable, to fully operationalize transitivity in an empirical application. Moreover, in
Sections 5 and 6 we will show that the WARP-based bounds produced by our methodology
are informatively tight.
4 Money metric welfare indices
For a given decision situation E, the previous section proposed a method that set identifies
individual income shares η1E and η
2
E by recovering sets of shadow prices Θ
1
E and Θ
2
E that
are consistent with our assumption of collective rationality. We next show that we can
use these bounds on the shadow prices θiE for each individual i to define informative upper
and lower bounds on individuals’ money metric welfare indices (MMWIs). As indicated
in the Introduction, Chiappori and Meghir (2014) advocated the use of these MMWIs
for individual welfare analysis based on the collective model.
Intrinsically, money metric welfare indices are so-called Hicksian compensation mea-
sures. At the end of this section, we will define the associated Slutsky compensation
concepts. In our following simulation exercise and empirical application, we will demon-
strate the practical usefulness of comparing our estimates for individuals’ (Hicksian)
money metric welfare indices and the associated Slutsky compensation metrics.
Theoretical concept. In words, an individual’s MMWI computes the minimum in-
come needed by household members to achieve the intrahousehold utility level (expressed
in terms of material consumption) when the individual comes to live alone. Formally,
for individual i in the observed decision situation E (with intrahousehold allocation
8The method to define bounds on individuals’ money metric welfare indices that we introduce in
Section 4 will also be based on WARP instead of SARP. In particular, our proofs of Propositions 4 and
5 will mainly use WARP-based revealed preference arguments (see Appendix A). See also Smeulders,
Cherchye, De Rock, Spieksma, and Talla Nobibon (2015) who study the relationship between WARP
and SARP for the labor supply setting on which we focus here.
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(l1E, l
2
E, QE)), we have
MMWI iE = min
li,Q
{wiEli +Q| (li, Q) ∈ Bi(liE, QE)},
whereBi(liE, QE) represents the better-than-set associated with the given bundle (l
i
E, QE),
i.e.
Bi(liE, QE) = {(li, Q)| U i(li, Q) ≥ U i(liE, QE)}.
Basically, this MMWI iE calculates the minimal expenditures over the bundles that
are at least as good as the bundle (liE, QE). In doing so, it accounts for the fact that,
when becoming single, the individual will have to bear the full cost (and no longer the
individual’s shadow cost θiE) for the publicly consumed good. For our set-up, the single’s
price for the (Hicksian) public good equals 1, which will usually be above the shadow
price θiE that applies to the given household situation.
Finally, we remark that obviously (liE, QE) ∈ Bi(liE, QE) and, by construction, the
individual cannot face a price decrease of the Hicksian good when becoming single (be-
cause θiE ≤ 1). Therefore, to compute MMWI iE it suffices to only consider bundles (li, Q)
with Q ≤ QE. We can use this in our following reasoning, by restricting attention to
bundles with lower quantities of the more expensive Hicksian good when moving from a
two-person household situation to single status.
Upper bound on MMWI iE. To define an informative upper bound on MMWI
i
E we
make use of the theoretical restrictions of collective rationality. The construction of the
upper bound mi,ubE requires an empirical inner bound approximation IB
i(liE, QE) of the
unknown better-than-set Bi(liE, QE). This use of an inner bound set IB
i(liE, QE) to define
an upper bound for MMWI iE parallels Varian (1982)’s procedure to compute bounds on
money metric utilities in a unitary household consumption context. The same remark
applies to the outer bound approximation OBi(liE, QE) that we will use to define a lower
bound for MMWI iE. Basically, our method provides a collective version of Varian’s
original method.
Our construction of the empirical inner bound IBi(liE, QE) makes use of the upper
bound θi,ubn on the shadow prices. More specifically, we define
IBi(liE, QE) = {(lin, Qn)|n ∈ N,Qn ≤ QE and win(lin − liE) + θi,ubn (Qn −QE) ≥ 0}.
In words, because we use the upper bound on the shadow prices that sustain collective
rationality, we can always conclude that (lin, Qn) is revealed preferred over (l
i
E, QE) if
win(l
i
n − liE) + θi,ubn (Qn − QE) ≥ 0. By construction, the last inequality will also be
satisfied for the true (but unobserved) shadow price (which is situated below θi,ubn ). Thus,
we obtain (lin, Qn) ∈ Bi(liE, QE) as soon as win(lin − liE) + θi,ubn (Qn − QE) ≥ 0. This is
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formally stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 We have that IBi(liE, QE) ⊆ Bi(liE, QE).
Based on Proposition 4, we can then define the upper bound
mi,ubE = minn
{wiEln +Qn| (lin, Qn) ∈ IBi(liE, QE)}.
Note that a simple enumeration procedure can be used to compute IBi(liE, QE) and
correspondingly mi,ubE . This is attractive from an empirical point of view.
Lower bound on MMWI iE. The construction of the empirical outer boundOB
i(liE, QE)
is slightly more complicated and makes use of the lower bound θi,lbn and upper bound θ
i,ub
n
on the shadow prices. More specifically, we define
OBi(liE, QE) ={(li, Q)|win(lin − li) + θi,lbn (Qn −Q) ≤ 0 for all n ∈ N for which
wiE(l
i
E − lin) + θi,lbE (QE −Qn) ≥ 0 if Qn < QE or
wiE(l
i
E − lin) + θi,ubE (QE −Qn) ≥ 0 if Qn ≥ QE}.
The last two inequality constraints ensure that, for a given n, we can always conclude
that (liE, QE) is revealed preferred over (l
i
n, Qn), while the first inequality constraint im-
plies that we can never conclude that (lin, Qn) is strictly revealed preferred over (l
i, Q).
Together this implies that we cannot conclude that (liE, QE) is strictly revealed preferred
over (li, Q). As a direct consequence, we cannot exclude (li, Q) from Bi(liE, QE). This
yields the following result.
Proposition 5 We have that {(li, Q) ∈ Bi(liE, QE)|Q ≤ QE} ⊆ OBi(liE, QE).
From this proposition, we can define the lower bound
mi,lbE = min
li,Q
{wiEli +Q| (li, Q) ∈ OBi(liE, QE)}.
Similar to before, it is straightforward to compute this lower bound through enumeration.
In this case, it suffices to solve a simple linear program for each n ∈ N that satisfies one
of the last two inequality restrictions in our definition of OBi(liE, QE).
Hicksian versus Slutsky compensations. The money metric welfare indices that we
defined above are so-called Hicksian compensation measures. These measures account for
the fact that individuals will adjust their behavior to changing prices (i.e. from Lindahl
prices to a price of unity for the public consumption). These behavioral adjustments
depend on the individuals’ preferences, which are represented by the utility functions U i.
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In the following sections, we will compare our estimates for these Hicksian compensa-
tion measures (i.e. the bounds mi,lbE and m
i,ub
E ) with the associated Slutsky compensation
measures, which ignore behavioral reactions to price changes. These measures are defined
as
siE = w
i
El
i
E +QE.
Implicitly, Slutsky compensation measures assume that individuals i do not adjust
their consumption (defining the bundle (liE, QE)) to the changing prices. Naturally, this
implies siE ≥ MMWI iE, which reflects the well-known property that Slutsky compen-
sations bound Hicksian compensations by construction. In our application in Section
6, by comparing our (bound) estimates for the money metric welfare indices with the
associated Slutsky compensation measures siE, we will obtain insight into the empirical
relevance of accounting for individual behavioral reactions to price changes.
5 Simulation analysis
To investigate the empirical performance of our revealed preference method, we begin
by conducting a simulation analysis. This simulation exercise serves to illustrate the
intrahousehold collective consumption mechanics that underlie our identification method,
which will also facilitate the interpretation of our empirical results in Section 6. To do
so, we will assume a fairly unsophisticated parametric specification of the individual
preferences and the bargaining process. We will consider the tightness of the bounds
that our method recovers for the within-household consumption sharing pattern (i.e.
the individuals’ shadow/Lindahl prices and associated expenditure shares) and for the
individuals’ money metric welfare indices. Attractively, we will conclude that, even for
our nonsophisticated parametric setting, our method generates bounds that are close to
the true individual shares ηiE, Lindahl prices θ
i
E and welfare indices MMWI
i
E.
Set-up. Following our theoretical exposition, we assume a setting with three com-
modities, i.e. (private and assignable) leisure of the two spouses and remaining (public)
Hicksian consumption. The individuals’ utility functions take the Cobb–Douglas form
U1(l1, Q) = α ln l1 + (1− α) lnQ,
U2(l2, Q) = β ln l2 + (1− β) lnQ.
In this simple specification, the parameters 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1 define the individuals’
preferences over private and public consumption. Generally, higher values for α and β
reflect stronger individual preferences for leisure. In what follows, we will use α = 1/2
and β = 1/4, meaning that household member 2 has stronger preferences for public
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consumption than household member 1.
As explained in Section 2, collective rationality means that the household consumption
bundle (l1E, l
2
E, QE) maximizes a weighted sum of the individual utility functions (i.e.
µ1EU
1 + µ2EU
2) subject to the household budget constraint. Here, we will assume that
individual bargaining weights depend on the individual wages (as prices of leisure), by
using µ1E = 1 and
µ2E =
3
2
w2E
w1E
.
The intuition is straightforward: the higher the individual’s wage, the stronger his or
her bargaining position. This positive relationship between an individual’s relative wage
and his/her bargaining weight has broad empirical support in the literature on collective
consumption models. See, for example, Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2014) for a
recent review.
In what follows, we will specifically focus on a household decision situation E with
aggregate income yE = 19.5 and wages w
1
E = 0.25 and w
2
E = 0.5. This corresponds to a
bargaining weight µ2E = 3, indicating that household member 2 has a stronger bargaining
position than member 1.
Intrahousehold sharing. For the given parametric specification and budget condi-
tions, we can directly define the individuals’ “true” Lindahl prices θiE and expenditure
shares ηiE. In our case, we obtain
θ1E = 0.182, θ
2
E = 0.818, η
1
E = 4.875 and η
2
E = 14.625,
corresponding to a household consumption bundle (l1E, l
2
E, QE) = (9.750, 7.315, 13.406).
The fact that member 1 contributes less to the public good than member 2 is not sur-
prising, given that this individual has a weaker preference for public consumption. Next,
the higher expenditure share of individual 2 reflects his/her better bargaining position.
Let us then investigate how well the bounds obtained through our empirical method
(outlined in Section 2) approximate the above theoretical values for θiE and η
i
E. In
particular, we focus on tightness of the sets ΘiE = [θ
i,lb
E , θ
i,ub
E ]. As explained in Section 2,
tight bounds for θiE directly translate into similarly tight bounds for η
i
E.
To apply our identification procedure, we simulate a large set N of bundles (l1, l2, Q)
that are collectively rational (for the given utilities and bargaining weights) under al-
ternative regimes of the wages w1, w2 and income y.9 This resulted in the following
9Specifically, our following identification results for individuals’ income shares, Lindahl prices and
money metric welfare indices are based on |N | = 8000. Details on our procedure to draw wages w1, w2
and incomes y are available upon request. As explained in Sections 3 and 4, our identification methods
require simple (enumeration) procedures, which makes it easy to consider large |N |.
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bounds
Θ1E = [0.171, 0.200] and Θ
2
E = [0.800, 0.830].
As a first observation, we note that these sets effectively contain the true values
θ1E = 0.182 and θ
2
E = 0.818, which empirically confirms our theoretical result in Propo-
sition 3. Next, and more interestingly, we observe that the bounds are very tight, which
obtains fairly precise set identification. This shows that our recovery method can allow
for a significantly informative analysis of the within-household distribution of individuals’
resources. Our empirical application in the next section will show that this attractive
feature also holds in real-life settings.
Money metric welfare. We next turn to identification of the individuals’ money met-
ric welfare indices MMWI iE. As a preliminary step, we again compute the “true” values
of these indices for our parametric specification and the given prices and household in-
come. In this application, these indices capture the income that individuals would need
as singles (for the wages (w1E, w
2
E) = (0.25, 0.50)) to be equally well off as in the house-
hold allocation (l1E, l
2
E, QE) = (9.750, 7.315, 13.406). For our specification of the utility
functions U1 and U2, we get
MMWI1E = 11.433 and MMWI
2
E = 17.000,
We observe that the sum of MMWI1E and MMWI
2
E clearly exceeds the household
income 19.5. Following Chiappori and Meghir (2014), this indicates gains from publicness
of Q (and, thus, scale economies following from living together). In addition, we find that
MMWI2E > MMWI
1
E, suggesting a higher welfare of the more powerful individual 2. At
this point, however, we must also emphasize that this kind of conclusions should be taken
with sufficient caution. In particular, for different reference prices, one may well obtain a
reverse ordering of the individual money metric welfare indices (see Chiappori and Meghir
(2014) for more discussion and a graphical example). Finally, we note that, for the given
reference prices, the difference between the individuals’ MMWIs is less pronounced than
between the income shares η1E and η
2
E. This reflects the fact that household member 1
“benefits” from member 2’s strong willingness to pay for the public consumption QE in
the situation where the two individuals form a household.
By using the information contained by the Lindahl price sets Θ1n and Θ
2
n for the
bundles n ∈ N , we can use the procedures presented in Section 4 to identify the upper
bound mi,ubE and lower bound m
i,lb
E . For our current application, this yields
m1,lbE = 8.050 and m
1,ub
E = 13.681,
m2,lbE = 16.750 and m
2,ub
E = 17.036.
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Like before, we observe that the bounds [8.050, 13.681] and [16.750, 17.036] contain
the true index values 11.433 and 17.000. Again, this confirms our theoretical results
in Propositions 4 and 5. Next, our bounds are tight, in particular for individual 2.
Intuitively, a higher bargaining weight combined with stronger preferences for public
consumption, implies that the observed household behavior reveals more information on
individual 2’s preferences for the public good. In turn, this leads to tighter money metric
bounds for this individual.
Importantly, our nonparametric bounds are also informatively tight. For example,
they accurately reveal the household’s gains from public consumption. As indicated
above, we can identify these scale economies by comparing the sum MMWI1E+MMWI
2
E
to the household expenditures y. In our case, even when we use the “conservative” lower
bound estimates for the money welfare indices, we find a fairly large difference between
m1,lbE + m
2,lb
E (= 24.8) and the household income y (= 19.5), thus revealing substantial
economies of scale associated with living together. Next, our bounds also correctly recover
that member 2 achieves a higher money metric welfare than member 1 for the chosen
reference prices: the sets [8.050, 13.681] and [16.745, 17.036] do not overlap, which means
that the difference between MMWI1E and MMWI
2
E is clearly identified.
As a final exercise, we compare our estimates of the individuals’ money metric welfare
indices with the corresponding Slutsky compensation measures siE = w
i
El
i
E +QE. For the
given set-up, we obtain
s1E = 15.843 and s
2
E = 17.063.
As explained at the end of Section 4, the indices MMWI1E and MMWI
2
E can be
interpreted as Hicksian compensation concepts, which differ from the Slutsky concepts
siE by effectively accounting for behavioral reactions associated with changing prices for
public consumption in different living arrangements (i.e the individual’s Lindahl price
when living together versus a price of unity when living alone). We observe that our
Hicksian estimates (mi,ubE and m
i,lb
E ) are below the Slutsky measures, which shows the
relevance of accounting for these behavioral reactions. The difference is most pronounced
for household member 1. This reflects that the Lindahl price for this member (with
bounds θi,lbE = 0.171 and θ
i,ub
E = 0.200) is substantially below the price of unity for public
consumption when living alone. Intuitively, this relates to the interpretation of these
Lindahl prices as indicating the individuals’ preferences (i.e. willingness-to-pay) for the
intrahousehold public consumption.
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6 Empirical application
We show the practical usefulness of our method through an empirical application to data
drawn from the 1999-2009 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In particular, we
consider the sample of 865 two-person households without children that was also studied
by Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and Vermeulen (2015). In their original set-up, these
authors distinguished between food, housing and other non-leisure expenditures. In line
with our exposition in the previous sections, we treat all non-leisure consumption as a
Hicksian (public) good.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the relevant data for the sample at hand.
Wages are net hourly wages. Leisure and annual hours worked are measured in hours
per year. Full income and consumption expenditures are measured in nominal dollars
per year. We refer to Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and Vermeulen (2015) for additional
details on the data construction method and sample selection procedure.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Male wage 28.43 18.82 3.43 140.77
Female wage 22.61 14.26 3.13 113.90
Male leisure 3,611.48 503.11 327.00 5,537.00
Female leisure 4,109.21 502.83 2,077.60 5,771.20
Male annual hours worked 2,212.52 503.11 287.00 5,497.00
Female annual hours worked 1,714.79 502.83 52.80 3,746.40
Expenditure on male leisure 103,502.04 72,549.92 3,569.24 567,204.85
Expenditure on female leisure 92,913.55 62,828.74 15,200.00 612,561.46
Expenditure on Hicksian good 39,463.99 24,404.09 8,200.00 183,716.00
Full income 235,879.59 117,467.87 75,620.37 716,813.60
Table 1: Summary statistics
To apply our method, we first estimate the household demand function g, which maps
combinations of w1, w2 and y on (l1, l2, Q) = g(w1, w2, y). In our following analysis,
we will consider a fully nonparametric system. The nonparametric regressions we use
are Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimators with a (Gaussian) radial basis function kernel.
This is a special case of the local polynomial estimator, for which it is known that the
residuals are asymptotically normally distributed under certain regularity conditions (Fan
and Gijbels, 1996). To operationalize the methods that we outlined in Sections 3 and
4, we draw a set N of demand bundles from the estimated demand. In the following
application, we use |N | = 400, 000.10
To show the versatility of our method, in Appendix B we also discuss the results
for a flexible parametric demand system. In particular, we consider Banks, Blundell,
and Lewbel (1997)’s Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS). We show that,
10More details on our drawing procedure are available upon request.
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for our application, the nonparametric kernel-based results are close to the QUAIDS-
based results. Given this close similarity between the nonparametric and parametric
bounds, our following exposition will solely consider results that are based on the kernel
estimation. An attractive feature of such a fully nonparametric analysis is that the
empirical conclusions are very robust to functional specification error.
As a final note, while our following analysis uses estimated household demand func-
tions, we will not explicitly take into account estimation errors. Recent research has
focused on inference for set identified objects. In particular, the studies of Kitamura
and Stoye (2013), Henry and Mourifie´ (2013), Hoderlein and Stoye (2014) and Kaido,
Molinari, and Stoye (2016) focus on set identification in a revealed preference context,
and provide machinery that might be used for developing inference tools for our method-
ology. However, applying these techniques to our setting is quite a bit more complicated
than existing applications to which such asymptotic theory has been successfully applied.
Similar issues arise in other applications that combine demand estimation with revealed
preference restrictions, such as Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008), Blundell, Kris-
tensen, and Matzkin (2014) and Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and Vermeulen (2015).
Sharing rule identification. As a first step, we compare our estimated upper and
lower bounds for the individual income shares with so-called naive bounds. To construct
these naive bounds, we exploit that leisure is private and assignable, so the value of a
household member’s leisure is a lower bound on that member’s share of full income. This
naive lower bound assigns all of the household’s non-leisure consumption to the other
household member. Similarly, a naive upper bound gives a household member his/her
leisure and all of the household’s non-leisure consumption. These naive bounds do not
make use of any revealed preference restrictions associated with the collective household
model. Comparing our revealed preference bounds with these naive bounds will provide
insight into the identifying power of our identification method.
The results of this comparison are summarized in Table 2, which reports on the
percentage point differences between upper and lower bounds on female expenditure
shares for our sample of households. Since the individual shares sum up to one, the
differences between the bounds are the same for men. Figure 4 in Appendix B gives an
overview of the sharing rule results for our full sample of households. Comparing the naive
bounds with the kernel-based bounds shows that our revealed preference based method
provides a substantial improvement over the naive bounds, even with fully nonparametric
demand function estimates. The average difference between the upper and lower naive
bounds is about 17.52 percentage points, which narrows to 12.37 percentage points using
the nonparametric estimates.
Interestingly, the bounds that we obtain are also informatively tight, which we il-
lustrate in Table 3. This table reports on the distribution of the bounds for males and
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females in our sample, by showing percentiles of the upper and lower bounds on indi-
viduals’ expenditure shares. Generally, we find that male and female resource shares
are increasing with income. Actually, this could have been expected. It indicates that
both male and female consumption are normal goods in the household. Next, we also
find that male shares are generally somewhat above the female shares. This reveals that
households are frequently characterized by unequal resource sharing, which turns out to
be mainly disadvantageous for females.
naive bounds kernel-based bounds
mean 17.52 12.37
minimum 3.28 2.53
1st quartile 12.12 8.72
median 15.78 11.20
3rd quartile 21.68 15.23
maximum 64.03 39.18
nr. obs. 865 865
Table 2: Percentage point differences between upper and lower bounds on individual
female expenditure shares
men women
percentile lower bound upper bound lower bound upper bound
10 44,164.1 62,357.1 37,762.5 56,460
20 57,650.8 77,453.9 51,661.7 69,787.1
30 69,100.9 90,366.2 60,266.8 80,947.2
40 78,354.6 99,948 69,939.2 92,845.2
50 88,799.1 114,435 82,624.6 109,464
60 103,382 130,149 94,371.4 121,275
70 120,469 152,908 107,762 139,339
80 148,955 183,500 134,420 172,288
90 195,878 244,181 172,784 221,761
Table 3: Sharing rule bounds
Recovery of money metric welfare indices. As argued in the Introduction, a spe-
cific advantage of our method over the method of Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and Ver-
meulen (2015) is that we can identify individuals’ money metric welfare indices. These
indices are particularly well-suited for individual welfare analysis in the context of the
collective consumption model. We refer to Chiappori and Meghir (2014) for an in-depth
discussion.
Table 4 gives a summary of the bounds that we obtain for our sample of households.
Some interesting observations emerge from comparing the results in this table with the
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sharing rule results in Table 3. First, we find that the difference between the upper and
lower bounds is generally close (and often tighter) in magnitude for the individual money
metric indices than for the individual income shares. This shows that our method yields
equally informative bounds for these two types of measures, which capture alternative
dimensions of within-household inequality in consumption and welfare.
Next, although there is quite some overlap between the intervals, we observe that
the bounds on the money metric indices are generally higher than for the individual
resource shares (for both males and females). This indicates the cost of becoming single
associated with the loss of public consumption (i.e., in a couple, public consumption
is associated with individual Lindahl prices, whereas singles have to pay the (higher)
market price for public consumption). Like for the expenditure shares in Table 3, the
compensations required for males to achieve their within-household utility levels when
they come to live alone are generally higher than the compensations required for females.
Similarly to before, this reflects the unequal sharing of consumption within households
(which was also captured by the sharing rule). However, the differences between the male
and female money metric indices in Table 4 are not exactly the same as the differences
between the male and female expenditure shares in Table 3. Intuitively, in terms of our
structural model of collective household consumption, these discrepancies follow from
diverging individual preferences for publicly consumed quantities.
men women
percentile m1,lbE m
1,ub
E m
2,lb
E m
2,ub
E
10 52,895.3 69,890.8 43,251.8 63,479.4
20 69,541.5 82,515.9 56,974 77,481.9
30 83,638.5 95,415.5 71,217.5 89,660.5
40 96,506 105,755 81,567.8 100,327
50 108,569 118,185 97,669.7 112,620
60 122,383 132,816 111,427 126,840
70 138,957 151,361 128,192 146,763
80 173,670 190,340 154,572 174,757
90 220,701 243,533 207,386 229,784
Table 4: Bounds on money metric welfare indices
By using the results that are summarized in Table 4, we can analyze households’ scale
economies that follow from public consumption. Following again our conservative proce-
dure, we obtain a lower bound estimate of households’ gains by subtracting the current
household income (y) from the sum of the nonparametrically estimated lower bounds
on the individuals’ money metric welfare indices (m1,lbE + m
2,lb
E ). Figure 1 presents the
distribution of these differences across our sample of households. We obtain non-positive
differences for about one quarter of the households. For these households, the current in-
come does not exceed the sum of our estimated lower bounds on the individual MMWI iE
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and, therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no gains from public con-
sumption. However, and more interestingly, for a large majority of our households, our
conservative procedure does reveal strictly positive gains, again showing the informative
value of our nonparametric identification method. As a matter of fact, for about one half
of the households we learn that the gains from living together amounts to at least 10,000
dollars, which represents a significant fraction of the expenditures on the Hicksian public
good for a modal household (see Table 1).
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Figure 1: Gains from public consumption
As a further comparison, we relate our estimation results for the individual money
metric indices to the Slutsky compensation measures siE = w
i
El
i
E +QE. To recall, money
metric welfare indices can be conceived as Hicksian compensation measures because they
incorporate behavioral reactions to price changes (i.e. from Lindahl prices for public
consumption when living together to prices of unity when living alone). These behavioral
effects are ignored by the Slutsky compensation measures.
To assess the empirical importance of these behavioral aspects, we compare the results
in Table 4 with those in Table 5. Interestingly the upper bounds mi,ubE of our Hicksian
measure are always (slightly) smaller than the Slutsky measures. This confirms once more
that our procedure results in significantly tight bounds. Next, the pronounced differences
between the Slutsky measures siE and the lower bounds m
i,lb
E indicate a substantial po-
tential relevance of accounting for behavioral effects when assessing the welfare impact
of price changes associated with becoming single.
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men women
percentile s1E s
2
E
10 70,090.1 64,496.3
20 82,637.2 78,281.4
30 96,314.1 90,235.1
40 106,069 101,023
50 118,868 114,240
60 133,175 127,205
70 153,515 146,926
80 190,340 177,788
90 243,932 230,178
Table 5: Slutsky compensation
Money metric welfare, total income and relative wages. The results of the above
identification analyses can be used to address a variety of empirical questions that specif-
ically relate to the intrahousehold distribution of consumption. For example, they allow
one to analyze the effects of household characteristics like income and relative wages on
individual consumption shares.11 A specific feature of our method is that we can now
also address these questions for money metric welfare indices.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows the relationship between the female money metric welfare
indices, which we here express as proportions of the households’ full incomes, and the
logarithms of these households’ full incomes. Each dot and plus sign on the figure repre-
sents the upper and lower bound for a given household in our sample. To help visualize
the results, we include trendlines of the estimated upper and lower bounds.
The trendlines are slightly decreasing, but quite close to horizontal. This finding
suggests that the female’s money metric index (as a proportion of the household’s full
income) does not vary with total income. The trendlines in Figure 2 show that the
average upper bounds are steadily around 55-65 percent and the average lower bounds
around 45-50 percent. However, the figure also shows considerable heterogeneity across
households. For example, some households have upper and lower bounds of the female
money metric utility index around 90 percent, whereas other households have bounds
around 10 percent.
Let us then compare these results to the ones of Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and
Vermeulen (2015), which are based on the sharing rule. These authors find that, on
average, the female’s (relative) income share is largely independent to the household’s
11These relationships received considerable attention in the literature on collective consumption mod-
els. It is frequently assumed in the empirical literature that bargaining power is independent of total
household income. See, for example, Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), Bargain and Donni (2012) and Dun-
bar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013), who use this assumption to obtain point identification for resource
shares. Next, the literature also provided systematic evidence that a household member’s bargaining
power generally increases with her/his wage. See, for example, Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002),
Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir (2007) and Oreffice (2011).
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full income. Based on panel (a) of Figure 2, we can add that this independence conclusion
also holds when using money metric welfare indices instead of the sharing rule. Next, a
notable difference between our results and the ones of Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel and
Vermeulen is that these authors find that the average female income share is situated
between 40 percent (lower bound) and 50 percent (upper bound), whereas our average
money metric indices are between 45-50 and 55-60 percent of the households’ full incomes.
Intuitively, this difference can be explained by the fact that the money metric indices take
account of scale economies for public consumption, as we dicussed above. Of course, given
the different welfare-economic interpretation of the alternative concepts, these differences
do not necessarily tell us much more.
Next, Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows the relationship between the female (relative) money
metric indices and the relative wages. We clearly observe that a woman’s money metric
welfare index, as a proportion of the household’s full income, generally increases when
her relative wage goes up. Again, this conclusion concurs with that of the literature. It
supports the argument that a household member’s bargaining power generally increases
with her/his wage, which results in higher individual welfare.
Individual poverty analysis. To conclude, our estimates allow us to conduct a poverty
analysis directly at the level of individuals in households rather than at the level of ag-
gregate households. By using the money metric indices, such a poverty analysis can si-
multaneously account for both economies of scale in consumption (through public goods)
and within-household sharing patterns (reflecting individuals’ bargaining positions). To
clearly expose the impact of these two mechanisms, we perform three different exercises.
In our first exercise, we compute the poverty rate defined in a more standard way, i.e. as
the percentage of households having full income that falls below the poverty line, which
we fix at 60 percent of the median full income in our sample of households. This also
equals the individual poverty rates if there would be equal sharing and no economies of
scale. The results of this exercise are given in Table 6 under the heading “Household
poverty rate”. We would label 11.33 percent of the individuals (and couples) as poor
if we ignored scale economies and assumed that household resources are shared equally
between males and females.
In a following exercise, we conduct individual poverty analysis on the basis of the
sharing rule. Here, we label an individual as poor if his/her income share estimate falls
below the individual poverty line, which we define as half of the poverty line for couples
that we used above. Based on our sharing rule bounds, we can compute upper and lower
bound estimates for the individual poverty rates. The outcomes are summarized under
the heading “Sharing rule” in Table 6. Our results indicate that, due to unequal sharing
of resources within households, the fraction of individuals living below the poverty line
may be considerably greater than the fraction obtained by standard measures that ignore
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as proportions of the household full household income (on vertical axis) versus log of
wage ratio (on horizontal axis)
Figure 2: Female money metric welfare indices, full household income and wage ratio.
The lines are trend lines obtained from a local linear fit.
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intrahousehold allocations. In other words, the incidence of poverty at the individual level
may be substantially higher than is indicated by standard measures based on household
level income. In particular females in households appear to be at risk of poverty because
of unequal resource sharing: even the lower bound estimate of female poverty (12.83
percent) is above the individual poverty rate that would occur in the case of equal sharing
(11.33 percent, i.e. the household poverty rate).
Finally, we redid the individual poverty analysis (using the same poverty line) but
now using the money metric welfare indices as the basis of our calculations. The results
of this exercise are reported under the heading “MMWI” in Table 6. We find that
both the lower and upper bound estimates of the individual poverty rates decrease when
compared to the poverty results based on the sharing rule. Intuitively, the presence of
public consumption (giving rise to scale economies) mitigates the risk of poverty. This
clearly highlights the importance of households’ scale economies in assessing individual
poverty. For some households/individuals, publicness of consumption may partly offset
the negative effect of unequal sharing and/or different individual Lindahl prices within
the household. Our method effectively allows us to disentangle the impact of the two
channels.
Households All individuals Males Females
Household poverty rate 11.33% - - -
Sharing rule
Upper bound - 26.71% 22.31% 31.10%
Lower bound - 10.69% 8.55% 12.83%
MMWI
Upper bound - 18.44% 14.91% 21.97%
Lower bound - 6.24% 4.62% 7.86%
Table 6: Poverty rates
Figure 3 shows, for the different income deciles, the proportion of households and
individual household members considered to be poor. Similar to before, the household
poverty rate (panel (a)) is based on the household full income, while the bounds for the
individual poverty rates are based on the bounds of the sharing rule (panel (b)) and the
money metric welfare indices (panel (c)).
From panel (a) in Figure 3, we learn that the poor (aggregate) households are all
situated in the bottom (20%) of the household income distribution. More revealingly,
while households in lower income deciles are typically characterized by a higher degree
of individual poverty, from panels (b) and (c) of the figure we also observe that poor
individuals are actually situated along the entire income distribution (and even in the
top deciles). Once more, this highlights the need to account for unequal resource sharing
when evaluating individual poverty. Finally, panel (c) again shows that individual poverty
rates (upper and lower bounds) are generally lower when based on money metric welfare
indices, which means that we account for intrahousehold scale economies.
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Figure 3: Poverty rates at different income percentiles
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7 Conclusion
We have presented a novel empirical method to analyze individuals’ welfare in a col-
lective consumption setting. Our method allows us to set identify the intrahousehold
sharing rule and individual money metric welfare indices from the observed household
demand behavior. The method builds on a revealed preference characterization of the
collective model that is intrinsically nonparametric. The method can be combined with
nonparametric as well as parametric demand estimation. The possibility to conduct a
fully nonparametric analysis is particularly attractive, as it yields empirical conclusions
that are robust to functional specification error.
We have demonstrated the practical usefulness of our method through a simulation
analysis and an empirical application to labor supply data drawn from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). We showed that our nonparametric method obtains informa-
tive bounds on the intrahousehold distribution of individual resource shares, willingness-
to-pay for public consumption (i.e. Lindahl prices) and money metric welfare indices.
In addition, our method clearly identified gains from public consumption (i.e. scale
economies) associated with living together (versus living alone). Further, we illustrated
the usefulness of our method in terms of comparing money metric welfare indices (as
Hicksian compensation measures) with Slutsky compensation measures. Such a compar-
ison provides insight into the empirical relevance of accounting for behavioral reactions
to price changes associated with becoming single. Finally, we showed the potential of our
method to investigate the effects of household characteristics like household income and
relative wages on individual welfare, and to assess the incidence of individual (instead of
household) poverty evaluated in terms of money metric welfare indices.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. We will focus on θi,ubE , but a readily similar argument holds
for θi,lbE . If the linear program presented in Section 3 has an infeasible region, then θ
i,ub
E
is set equal to one and there is nothing to prove. So let us assume that the program is
feasible and, thus, the following conditions hold simultaneously for θi,ubE :
wiE(l
i
n − liE) + (θi,ubE + δ)(Qn −QE) < 0
win(l
i
E − lin) < 0
win(l
i
E − lin) + (QE −Qn) < 0,
which means that θi,ubE +δ is not consistent with the WARP condition (1) in the main text.
As an implication, it does not sustain collective rationality and, therefore, θi,ubE + δ /∈ ΦiE.
Given the second inequality (which implies liE < l
i
n), we learn from the first inequality
that (Qn − QE) < 0. This implies that the above inequalities also hold for any θ˜ above
θi,ubE + δ, i.e. θ˜ 6∈ ΦiE for θ˜ ≥ θi,ubE + δ. Thus, θi,ubE effectively constitutes an upper bound
on the shadow prices sustaining collective rationality that are contained in ΦiE.
Proof of Proposition 4. To obtain the wanted conclusion (i.e. IBi(liE, QE) ⊆ Bi(liE, QE)),
we need to show (lin, Qn) ∈ Bi(liE, QE) for any (lin, Qn) ∈ IBi(liE, QE).
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As a first step, (lin, Qn) ∈ IBi(liE, QE) implies
(Qn −QE) ≤ 0 and win(lin − liE) + θi,ubn (Qn −QE) ≥ 0.
Because θi,ubn ≥ θin for any θin ∈ Θin, these two inequalities imply win(lin − liE) + θin(Qn −
QE) ≥ 0 for any θin ∈ Θin.
Next, because ΦiE ⊆ Θin, we thus have win(lin− liE) + θ¯in(Qn−QE) ≥ 0 for any shadow
price θ¯in ∈ ΦiE that sustains collective rationality (following Proposition 3). Then, using a
basic (WARP-based) revealed preference argument (see, for example, Varian (1982)), this
last inequality implies U i(lin, Qn) ≥ U i(liE, QE) or, equivalently, (lin, Qn) ∈ Bi(liE, QE).
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that (li, Q) /∈ OBi(liE, QE). This implies that there
exists n ∈ N such that
wiE(l
i
E − lin) + θi,lbE (QE −Qn) ≥ 0 if Qn < QE, or
wiE(l
i
E − lin) + θi,ubE (QE −Qn) ≥ 0 if Qn ≥ QE,
and
win(l
i
n − li) + θi,lbn (Qn −Q) > 0.
From the first two inequalities, we can conclude that U i(liE, QE) ≥ U i(lin, Qn) for
the given n. Like in our proof of Proposition 4, this last result follows from a basic
(WARP-based) revealed preference argument (see, for example, Varian (1982)) and using
ΦiE ⊆ ΘiE (following Proposition 3, for ΦiE containing the shadow prices that sustain
collective rationality).
In what follows, we will consider two cases: Qn ≥ Q and Qn < Q. For each case,
we will obtain that (li, Q) /∈ {(li′, Q′) ∈ Bi(liE, QE)|Q′ ≤ QE}, which gives the wanted
conclusion (i.e. {(li, Q) ∈ Bi(liE, QE)|Q ≤ QE} ⊆ OBi(liE, QE)).
We begin by considering Qn ≥ Q. Then, from the above constraints, the inequality
win(l
i
n − li) + θin(Qn − Q) > 0 holds for any θin ∈ Θin. Given this, a similar revealed
preference argument as above yields U i(lin, Qn) > U
i(li, Q). Thus, U i(liE, Q
i
E) > U
i(li, Q),
which gives (li, Q) /∈ Bi(liE, QE).
Next, we turn to Qn < Q. For l
i
E > l
i, when using that we need only consider Q ≤ QE,
a directly similar argument as before obtains (li, Q) /∈ Bi(liE, QE).
Thus, the only situation left to consider is Qn < Q and l
i
E ≤ li. If wiE(liE − li) +
θi,lbE (QE −Q) > 0, the same argument as before implies U i(liE, QiE) > U i(li, Q) and, thus,
(li, Q) /∈ Bi(liE, QE).
As a final step, we show that we can exclude wiE(l
i
E−li)+θi,lbE (QE−Q) ≤ 0 for Qn < Q
and liE ≤ li. To see this, we first note that, because win(lin − li) + θi,lbn (Qn − Q) > 0 and
Qn < Q, we must have l
i
n > l
i. Because li ≥ liE, this implies (lin − liE) > 0. Next, for
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U i(liE, QE) ≥ U i(lin, Qn), collective rationality requires θi,lbn (QE −Qn) + win(liE − lin) ≥ 0.
Using (lin − liE) > 0, we can rephrase this as
QE −Qn
lin − liE
≥ w
i
n
θi,lbn
.
Then, win(l
i
n − li) + θi,lbn (Qn − Q) > 0 implies Q < Qn +
win
θi,lbn
(lin − li). Using the above
inequality, we can rewrite this as
Q < Qn(
li − liE
lin − liE
) +
QE
lin − liE
(lin − li).
In turn, because wiE(l
i
E − lin) + θi,lbE (QE −Qn) ≥ 0 implies Qn ≤ (
wiE(l
i
E − lin)
θi,lbE
+QE), we
must have
Q < (
wiE(l
i
E − lin)
θi,lbE
+QE)(
li − liE
lin − liE
) +
QE
lin − liE
(lin − li).
Rearranging obtains
0 < wiE(l
i
E − li) + θi,lbE (QE −Q),
which effectively excludes wiE(l
i
E − li) + θi,lbE (QE −Q) ≤ 0.
B Additional empirical results
To show the versatility of our method, and to assess robustness of our main empirical
results, we also combine our identification method with Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel
(1997)’s Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS). This demand system was
also used by Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and Vermeulen (2015), and we refer to that
paper for a detailed explanation of the QUAIDS system that we use here. In line with
Cherchye et al. (2015), we consider QUAIDS estimates with and without accounting for
taste shifters (in casu, age of the husband and a dummy for home ownership). Our
QUAIDS parameter estimates are available upon request.
As explained in Section 6, a difference between our set-up and the original set-up
of Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel and Vermeulen is that we consider only three goods (i.e.
leisure of the two spouses and Hicksian (public) consumption) instead of five goods, which
makes that our empirical results are not directly comparable. Next, the fact that we focus
on a three-goods setting also makes that, in contrast to Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel and
Vermeulen, we cannot impose the SR1 condition of Browning and Chiappori (1998) in
our QUAIDS estimation. The reason is that this SR1 condition only has empirical bite
if there are at least 5 goods.
The QUAIDS-based sharing rule bounds are summarized in Table 7. Like Table
32
2, it reports on the percentage point differences between upper and lower bounds on
individual expenditure shares for our sample of households. When comparing Tables 2
and 7, we find that the nonparametric kernel-based bounds are close to the QUAIDS-
based bounds, which indicates that our parametric QUAIDS model yields results similar
to the nonparametric demand system.
As a further comparison, Figures 4 and 5 present the width of the kernel-based and
QUAIDS-based sharing rule bounds (in absolute terms). Each dot represents a household.
The improved width is on the vertical axis and the naive width on the horizontal axis.
Interestingly, the width of the sharing rule bounds is reduced by (more than) half for a
significant number of households. In line with our above conclusion, the kernel-based and
QUAIDS-based results are very similar.
QUAIDS QUAIDS with taste shifters
mean 11.35 11.03
minimum 2.55 2.54
1st quartile 7.82 7.47
median 10.27 10.02
3rd quartile 14.27 13.59
maximum 36.69 36.61
nr. obs. 865 865
Table 7: Percentage point differences between upper and lower bounds on individual
female expenditure shares
Figure 4: Width of sharing rule bounds in absolute terms (red line = naive bounds)
(kernel-based)
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Figure 5: Width of sharing rule bounds in absolute terms (red line = naive bounds)
(QUAIDS-based)
Finally, Tables 8, 9 and 10 have a directly similar interpretation as the kernel-based
Tables 3, 4 and 5 in the main text, but are QUAIDS-based (with and without taste
shifters). Once more, the QUAIDS-based analyses are very similar to the kernel-based
results in the main text.
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QUAIDS
men women
percentile lower bound upper bound lower bound upper bound
10 48,127.2 63,699.1 39,258.9 53,740.7
20 59,933.3 78,409.1 52,245.6 67,917.3
30 71,456.7 90,138.4 60,967.2 79,410.5
40 79,292.6 99,530.9 69,947.8 91,104.5
50 89,734.6 113,807 82,192.7 107,976
60 103,793 129,365 93,999.6 120,538
70 119,860 151,887 107,820 138,630
80 148,920 183,349 134,324 172,328
90 195,916 244,404 172,092 221,465
QUAIDS with taste shifters
men women
percentile lower bound upper bound lower bound upper bound
10 48,065.9 62,590.8 39,415.9 53,923.2
20 59,850.1 76,985.6 53,013.4 67,913.6
30 71,555.3 88,620.5 61,436.7 79,558.5
40 79,304 99,369.7 70,085.3 91,254.5
50 90,223.5 113,528 82,793.9 107,611
60 103,539 130,136 94,739.6 120,127
70 120,159 151,442 107,582 138,357
80 149,019 183,164 134,659 172,221
90 195,891 244,331 171,372 221,493
Table 8: Sharing rule bounds
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QUAIDS
men women
percentile m1,lbE m
1,ub
E m
2,lb
E m
2,ub
E
10 57,866.7 67,204.5 41,192.2 60,832.9
20 74,983.4 82,650.8 55,874.9 75,505.5
30 86,557.7 94,561.7 67,554.7 88,240.5
40 97,474.5 104,772 77,208.6 98,075.9
50 108,503 117,949 91,258.5 113,365
60 122,881 135,949 104,105 127,954
70 140,977 154,790 121,206 143,848
80 173,473 188,494 152,268 177,347
90 224,826 246,064 199,745 223,227
QUAIDS with taste shifters
men women
percentile m1,lbE m
1,ub
E m
2,lb
E m
2,ub
E
10 56,820.7 65,082.6 42,185.1 57,418.7
20 72,988.3 80,004 55,455.9 70,841.8
30 84,717.7 90,896 67,619.4 83,612.9
40 96,075.3 101,555 76,738.2 94,335.6
50 106,164 114,491 90,677 109,169
60 120,662 131,311 103,578 123,526
70 139,229 150,138 120,500 138,481
80 170,960 180,885 150,672 171,849
90 221,360 239,860 198,239 218,258
Table 9: Bounds on money metric welfare indices
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QUAIDS
men women
percentile s1E s
2
E
10 68,835.8 64,689.1
20 84,207.8 77,617.8
30 95,638.2 89,735.5
40 106,652 99,313.6
50 119,381 115,479
60 136,169 129,620
70 156,479 144,671
80 189,752 178,319
90 246,655 223,432
QUAIDS with taste shifters
men women
percentile s1E s
2
E
10 67,369.1 62,176.8
20 81,218.8 75,026.2
30 93,104.8 87,209.4
40 103,489 96,124.9
50 116,206 111,945
60 132,225 125,627
70 151,605 139,672
80 183,776 173,198
90 240,360 218,274
Table 10: Slutsky compensation
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